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1

JURISDICTION
The

Utah

Court

of

Appeals

has

jurisdiction

over

these

consolidated cases pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-2a-3(2)(b) (1992
8c Supp. 1194) .
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW
1.

Was State Farm required to exhaust its administrative

remedies before seeking judicial review of orders issued by the
Director of the Utah Antidiscrimination Division ("UADD").
Because this is strictly an issue of law pertaining to subject
matter jurisdiction, the Court of Appeals does not defer to the
trial courts' rulings and reviews such rulings under a correction
of

error

standard.

Maverik

Country

Stores

v.

Industrial

Commission, 860 P.2d 944 (Utah App. 1993); also see St. Benedict's
Development Co. v. St. Benedict's Hospital, 811 P.2d 194

(Utah

1991) (standard of review on orders dismissing for failure to state
a claim.)
2.

Did State Farm file its petitions for judicial review of

the UADD Director's Orders within the time permitted by law.
As with the previous issue, this is strictly an issue of law
pertaining to subject matter jurisdiction.

The Court of Appeals

will therefore exercise plenary authority to determine whether
subject

matter

jurisdiction

exists.

Silva

v.

Department

Employment Security, 786 P.2d 246, 247 (Utah App. 1990).

of

APPLICABLE STATUTORY PROVISIONS
The

following provisions of law are determinative

to the

issues raised in these appeals:
Section 63-46b-14, Utah Administrative Procedures Act.
Section 34-35-7.1, Utah Antidiscriminatory Act.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The Industrial Commission accepts the statement of the case
set forth in State Farm's brief.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The

Utah

Administrative

Procedures

Act,

the

Utah

Antidiscriminatory Act, and a prior decision of the Utah Court of
Appeals require parties to exhaust their administrative remedies
under

the Utah Antidiscriminatory

review.

Act before

seeking

judicial

Because State Farm failed to exhaust its administrative

remedies in these cases, the district court properly dismissed
State Farm's petitions for judicial review.
State Farm's petitions for judicial review are also subject to
dismissal because they were not filed within 3 0 days from the date
of

the

UADD

Director's

Order,

Administrative Procedures Act.

2

as

required

by

the

Utah

ARGUMENT
POINT ONE
STATE FARM'S PETITIONS FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW WERE PROPERLY
DISMISSED BY THE DISTRICT COURT FOR LACK OF SUBJECT
MATTER JURISDICTION, DUE TO STATE FARM'S FAILURE TO
EXHAUST ITS ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES.
State Farm argues it is free to "elect" whether or not to
exhaust

the

administrative

remedies

provided

under

the

Antidiscriminatory Act, Utah Code Ann. §34-35-1 et seq.

Utah

However,

State Farm's argument is contradicted by the plain language of the
Utah Administrative Procedures Act (U.A.P.A.), Utah Code Ann. §6346b-l et seq. and the Antidiscriminatory Act itself, as that act
has been previously interpreted by the Court of Appeals.
Section 63-46b-14(2) of the U.A.P.A. sets forth a general rule
requiring

exhaustion

of

administrative

remedies,

plus

exceptions to that general rule:
(2)
A party may seek judicial review only after
exhausting all administrative remedies available, except
that:
(a) a party seeking judicial review need not exhaust
administrative remedies if this chapter or any other
statute states that exhaustion is not required;
(b) the court may relieve a party seeking judicial
review of the requirement to exhaust any or all
administrative remedies if:
(i) the administrative remedies are inadequate; or
(ii)
exhaustion
of
remedies
would
result
in
irreparable harm disproportionate to the public benefit
derived from requiring exhaustion.

3

two

Thus, §63-46b-14(2) of the U.A.P.A. requires exhaustion of
administrative

remedies

as

a

condition

precedent

to

judicial

review, except under the limited circumstances described in §6346b-14 (2) (a) and (b) .
Subsection 63-46b-14(2)(b) of the U.A.P.A. excuses a party
from exhausting its administrative remedies if irreparable harm
would result, or if exhaustion of administrative purposes would
serve no useful purpose.

State Farm does not contend that either

criteria is present in these cases.
Subsection 63-46b-14(2)(a) of the U.A.P.A. does not require
exhaustion of administrative remedies if the U.A.P.A. or some other
statute

"states that exhaustion is not required."

State Farm

argues the Antidiscriminatory Act can be read to fit within the
foregoing provision.

However, State Farm's argument ignores the

plain language of the Antidiscriminatory Act.
Section 34-35-7.1 of the Antidiscriminatory Act establishes a
comprehensive process for investigation, adjudication and review of
discrimination claims.
investigated by U.A.D.D.1

Claims of discrimination are filed and
The Division Director then determines

whether unlawful discrimination has occurred and issues an order
accordingly.2
1

Utah Code Ann. §34-35-7.1(3) (b) .

2

Utah Code. Ann. §§34-35-7.1(4) and (5).
4

A party aggrieved by the Director's order may then request an
evidentiary hearing.3

If no request for evidentiary hearing is

the Director's order becomes final.4

made,

If an evidentiary

hearing is requested, an ALJ conducts a de novo hearing and issues
a separate order on the claim of discrimination.5
At this point, one of two things can occur.

The parties may

simply do nothing, in which case the ALJ's decision becomes the
final decision of the Commission pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §34-357.1(11) (b).

Alternatively, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §34-35-

7.1(11) (a), a party

may

file

a motion

Commission to review the ALJ's order.
related

reconsideration,

is

the

asking

the

Industrial

Such a review, and any

final

administrative

remedy

available under the Antidiscriminatory Act.
It is at this point that the Antidiscriminatory Act allows
judicial review, but only of those orders which came before the
Industrial Commission on a party's motion for review.

Subsection

34-35-7.1 (12) provides:
An order of the commission under Subsection (11)(a) is
subject to judicial review as provided in Section 63-46b16.

3

Utah Code Ann. §§34-35-7.1(4)(c) and (5)(c).

4

Utah Code Ann. §§34-35-7.1(4)(d) and (5)(d).

5

Utah Code Ann. §§34-35-7.1(8) and (9).
5

The critical significance of §34-35-7.1(12) is that it limits
the availability

of

judicial

review to those cases where

the

parties have taken each step available under the administrative
process, which is to say, where the parties have exhausted their
administrative remedies.
The Court of Appeals itself has pointed out the significance
of §34-35-7.1(12) of the Antidiscriminatory Act:
Subsection 12 simply embodies the general principle that
a party must exhaust its administrative remedies prior to
obtaining judicial review.
Maverik Country Stores v.
Industrial Commission, 860 P.2d 944, 947 (Utah App.
1993) .
State Farm cites the Court of Appeals' decision in Heinecke v.
Dept.

of

Commerce,

proposition

that

remedies before

810

a party

P.2d

459

need

not

(Utah

App.

exhaust

seeking judicial review.

its

1991)

for

the

administrative

However,

in Maverik

ibid., footnote 5 at page 948, the Court of Appeals cast doubt on
its decision in Heinecke.

Furthermore, Heinecke interpreted the

requirements of Utah's professional licensing laws, not the Utah
Antidiscriminatory Act. Even if Utah's professional licensing laws
do not require exhaustion of administrative remedies, the Utah
Antidiscriminatory Act does.
Finally, State Farm argues that because it never requested an
evidentiary hearing, the Director's orders in both Mena and Jensen
resulted from "informal" proceedings.
6

State Farm then points to

§63-46b-15(1)(a) of the U.A.P.A., which allows district courts to
review

agency

proceedings,

actions

and

claims

resulting
that

from

informal

§63-46b-15(1)(a)

adjudicative

excuses

it

from

exhausting its administrative remedies under the Antidiscriminatory
Act.
While State Farm's argument is ingenious, it lacks substance.
Section 63-46b-15(l) (a) of the U.A.P.A., which is the linchpin of
State

Farm's

argument,

evidences

no

purpose

to

override

the

explicit requirement found in §63-46b-14 (2) of the U.A.P.A. that
parties must exhaust

their administrative

remedies.

If State

Farm's interpretation of §63-46b-15 (1) (a) were to be accepted, the
practical effect would allow parties unsuccessful in proceedings
before UADD to then select the forum where the next level of
adjudication

would

administrative

occur.

remedies

Simply
of

the

by

refusing

to pursue

Antidiscriminatory

Act,

the
the

unsuccessful party could transfer the proceeding to the district
courts.

Such a result would undercut the legislative intent, set

forth in §34-35-7.1(15) of the Utah Antidiscriminatory Act:
The procedures contained in this section are the
exclusive
remedy under state
law for employment
discrimination. . .
In summary, §63-46b-14(2) of the U.A.P.A. and §34-35-7.1 of
the

Utah

Antidiscriminatory

Act

require

that

allegations

of

employment discrimination be adjudicated according to the system
7

created by the legislature in the Utah Antidiscriminatory Act.
Both the Antidiscriminatory Act and the U.A.P.A. require parties to
exhaust

the

administrative

Antidiscriminatory Act.

remedies

available

under

the

Because State Farm failed to exhaust its

administrative remedies, the district courts correctly concluded
that they lacked jurisdiction to consider State Farm's petitions
for judicial review.

POINT TWO
THE DISTRICT COURTS LACKED JURISDICTION OVER
STATE FARM'S COMPLAINTS BECAUSE THE COMPLAINTS
WERE NOT FILED IN TIME.
The

timely

jurisdictional.

filing

of

a petition

for

judicial

review

is

Silva v. Department of Employment Security, 786

P.2d 246, 247 (Utah App. 1990).

Section 63-46b-14 (3) (a) of the

U.A.P.A. allows 30 days to seek judicial review of agency action:
A party shall file a petition for
final agency action within 3 0 days
the order constituting final agency
is considered to be issued under
13(3)(b).
(Emphasis added.)

judicial review of
after the date that
action is issued or
Subsection 63-46b-

The filing period begins to run on the date the decision bears on
its face.

Dusty7 s, Inc. v. Auditing Division, 842 P.2d 868, 870

(Utah 1992).
court.

"Filing" is accomplished by actual delivery to the

Maverik Country Stores v. Industrial Commission, ibid.,

950.
8

Applying the foregoing standards to the facts of the cases now
before the Court of Appeals, State Farm's petition for review in
Mena was not filed until 57 days after the Director's order was
issued.

State Farm's petition for review in Jensen was not filed

until 60 days after the Director's order was issued.

Thus, in both

cases, State Farm failed to file its petitions for review within
_the 30 days allowed by §63-46b-14 (3) of the U.A.P.A.
In arguing that its petitions for review were not untimely,
State Farm attempts to "stack" the 30 day period allowed by §6346b-14(3) for filing for judicial review on top of the 30 day
period allowed by §34-35-7.1(5) of the Antidiscriminatory Act for
requesting an evidentiary hearing.

According to State Farm:

(Such a result) can be easily harmonized by construing
Utah Code Ann. §63-46b-14 (3) (a) to mean that the petition
for review of final agency action must be filed within 3 0
days after the order constituting final agency action
"becomes final." (Emphasis added.)
The foregoing passage from State Farm's brief indicates a
recognition by State Farm that it has failed to meet the filing
deadline of §63-46b-14(3) of the U.A.P.A.

State Farm seeks rescue

from its dilemma by inviting the Court of Appeals to "construe"
additional

language

into §63-46b-14(3).

The Court of Appeals

should decline State Farm's invitation and instead apply the plain
language of the U.A.P.A., including its requirement that petitions
for judicial review be filed within 30 days.
9

CONCLUSION
State Farm has created its own predicament.

By failing to

exhaust its administrative remedies under the Antidiscriminatory
Act, State Farm has precluded judicial review.

Likewise, State

Farm's disregard of administrative procedure has resulted in its
failure to meet the time periods for filing for judicial review.
At the risk of straining an analogy, once a locomotive leaves
the tracks, it may be impossible to get things rolling again.

In

this case, State Farm's train irrevocably left the tracks during
August 1993, when State Farm failed to request evidentiary hearings
to challenge the Director's orders.
The

district

courts

properly

concluded

they

lacked

jurisdiction to consider State Farm's petitions for judicial review
due to the fact State Farm had failed to exhaust its administrative
remedies.

In addition to the reason relied upon by the district

courts, State Farm's petitions for review were also subject to
dismissal because they were not filed on time.
the district

For either reason,

courts' dismissals of State Farm's petitions

for

judicial review should be affirmed.
Dated this 25th day of January, 1994.

By
Alan Hennebold, General Counsel
Industrial Commission of Utah
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APPENDIX 1

Utah Administrative Procedures Act/ §63-46b-14; Judicial review Exhaustion of administrative remedies.
(1)
A party aggrieved may obtain judicial review of final
agency action, except in actions where judicial review is expressly
prohibited by statute.
(2) A party may seek judicial review only after exhausting all
administrative remedies available, except that:
(a) a party seeking judicial review need not exhaust
administrative remedies if this chapter or any other statute states
that exhaustion is not required;
(b) the court may relieve a party seeking judicial review of
the requirement to exhaust any or all administrative remedies if:
(i) the administrative remedies are inadequate*; or
(ii) exhaustion of remedies would result in irreparable
harm disproportionate to the public benefit derived from requiring
exhaustion.
(3) (a) A party shall file a petition for judicial review of
final agency action within 3 0 days after the date that the order
constituting the final agency action is issued or is considered to
have been issued under Subsection 63-46b-13(3)(b).
(b) The petition shall name the agency and all other
appropriate parties as respondents and shall meet the form
requirements specified in this chapter.

Utah Antidiscriminatory Act, §34-35-7.1. Procedure for aggrieved
person to file claim - Investigations - Adjudicative proceedings Settlement - Reconsideration - Determination.
(1)
(a)
Any person
claiming
to be
aggrieved
by
a
discriminatory or prohibited employment practice may by himself,
his attorney, or his agent, make, sign, and file with the
commission a request for agency action.
(b) Every request for agency action shall be verified under
oath or affirmation.
(c) A request for agency action made under this section shall
be filed within 180 days after the alleged discriminatory or
prohibited employment practice occurred.
(2)
Any employer, labor organization, joint apprenticeship
committee, or vocational school who has employees or members who
refuse or threaten to refuse to comply with the provisions of this
chapter may file with the commission a request for agency action
asking the commission for assistance to obtain their compliance by
conciliation or other remedial action.
(3) (a)
Before a hearing is set or held as part of any
adjudicative proceeding, the commission shall promptly assign an
investigator to attempt a settlement between the parties by
conference, conciliation, or persuasion.
(b) If no settlement is reached, the investigator shall make
a prompt impartial investigation of all allegations made in the
request for agency action.
(c) The commission and its staff, agents, and employees shall
conduct every investigation in fairness to all parties and agencies
involved, and may not attempt a settlement between the parties if
it is clear that no discriminatory or prohibited employment
practice has occurred.
(d) If the aggrieved party wishes to withdraw the request for
agency action, he must do so prior to the issuance of a final
order.
(4)
(a)
If
the
initial
attempts
at
settlement
are
unsuccessful, and the investigator uncovers insufficient evidence
during
his
investigation
to
support
the
allegations
of
a
discriminatory or prohibited employment practice set out in the
request for agency action, the investigator shall formally report
these findings to the director.
(b) Upon receipt of the investigator's report, the director
may issue a determination and order for dismissal of
the
adjudicative proceeding.
(c) A party may make a written request to the director for an
evidentiary hearing to review de novo the director's determination
and order within 3 0 days of the date of the determination and order
for dismissal.
(d) If the director receives no timely request for a hearing,
the determination and order issued by the director becomes the
final order of the commission.
(5) (a) If the initial attempts at settlement are unsuccessful
and the investigator uncovers sufficient evidence during his
investigation to support the allegations of a discriminatory or

prohibited employment practice set out in the request for agency
action, the investigator shall formally report these findings to
the director.
(b) Upon receipt of the investigator's report the director
may issue a determination and order based on the investigator's
report.
(c) A party may file a written request to the director for an
evidentiary hearing to review de novo the director's determination
and order within 3 0 days of the date of the determination and
order.
(d) If the director receives no timely request for a hearing,
the determination and order issued by the director requiring the
respondent to cease any discriminatory or prohibited employment
practice and to provide relief to the aggrieved party becomes the
final order of the commission.
(6)
In any adjudicative proceeding, the investfigator who
investigated the matter may not participate in a hearing except as
a witness, nor may he participate in the deliberations of the
presiding officer.
(7) Prior to commencement of an evidentiary hearing, the party
filing the request for agency action may reasonably and fairly
amend any allegation, and the respondent may amend its answer.
Those amendments may be made during or after a hearing but only
with permission of the presiding officer.
(8) (a) If, upon all the evidence at a hearing, the presiding
officer finds that a respondent has not engaged in a discriminatory
or prohibited employment practice, the presiding officer shall
issue an order dismissing the request for agency action containing
the allegation of a discriminatory or prohibited
employment
practice.
(b) The presiding officer may order that the respondent be
reimbursed by the complaining party for his attorneys' fees and
costs.
(9)
If upon all the evidence at the hearing, the presiding
officer finds that a respondent has engaged in a discriminatory or
prohibited employment practice, the presiding officer shall issue
an order requiring the respondent to cease any discriminatory or
prohibited employment practice and to provide relief to the
complaining party, including reinstatement, back pay and benefits,
and attorneys' fees and costs.
(10)
Conciliation between the parties is to be urged and
facilitated at all stages of the adjudicative process.
(11) (a) Either party may file a written request for review of
the order issued by the presiding officer in accordance with
Section 63-46b-12.
(b) If there is no timely request for review the order issued
by the presiding officer becomes the final order of the commission.
(12) An order of the commission under Subsection (11)(a) is
subject to judicial review as provided in Section 63-46b-16.
(13)
The commission shall have authority to make rules
concerning procedures under this chapter in accordance with Title
63, Chapter 46a, Utah Administrative Rulemaking Act.
(14)
The members of the commission and its staff may not

divulge
or
make
public
any
information
gained
from
any
investigation, settlement negotiation, or proceeding before the
commission except in the following:
(a)
Information used by the director
in making
any
determination may be provided to all interested parties for the
purpose of preparation for and participation in proceedings before
the commission.
(b) General statistical information may be disclosed provided
the identities of the individuals or parties are not disclosed.
(c) Information may be disclosed for inspection by the
attorney general or other legal representatives of the state or
commission.
(d) Information may be disclosed
for information
and
reporting requirements of the federal government.
(15)
The procedures contained in this section are the
exclusive remedy under state law for employment discrimination
based upon race, color, sex, retaliation, pregnancy, childbirth, or
pregnancy-related conditions, age, religion, national origin, or
handicap.
(16)
The commencement of an action under federal law for
relief based upon any act prohibited by this chapter bars the
commencement or continuation of any adjudicative proceeding before
the Utah Antidiscrimination Division in connection with the same
claims under this chapter. Nothing in this subsection is intended
to alter, amend, modify, or impair the exclusive remedy provision
set forth in Subsection (15).

